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“Hong-Kong Style Cultural Revolution” —
Weaponization of the Cultural Revolution in the 2019 Hong Kong Protests
Abstract
The pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong started in June 2019 received international attention as clashes prolonged. A pecu-
liar phenomenon has been observed in the textual space of both the pro-democracy camp and the pro-government camp, which 
is a shared set of terms surrounding the Chinese Cultural Revolution amid the camps’ antagonism. This essay thus investigates 
the comparisons between either the pro-democracy protests or the pro-government movement, with the Cultural Revolution, 
made by Hong Kong writers who position differently in the political spectrum. This essay aims to analyze the use of the Cul-
tural Revolution as an idiomatic weapon to attack the opposing camp to draw insights to both Hong Kong’s perception of the 
Cultural Revolution and the characteristics of the current protests. The border goal of the essay is to show how the Cultural 
Revolution’s impact is still echoing.
I.
The on-going pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong 
have lasted for half a year by now and show no sign of termina-
tion. In June 2019, the protests were sparked by the opposition 
to the extradition bill, which would have permitted extradition 
to mainland China, leading to worries that Hong Kong’s au-
tonomy would be undermined by exposing the locals to the le-
gal system of mainland China. While the protesters claim their 
rights in defending the democratic system of the city against the 
Chinese authority, their opponents denounce their ideals and 
their actions for damaging the city’s socio-economic stability. 
The antagonism between the pro-democracy camp 
and the pro-government camp constructs two completely dif-
ferent sets of vocabulary adopted by the media of the opposing 
camps. However, a set of terms can be found in the textual 
space of both camps — the Cultural Revolution. The Cultural 
Revolution, a socio-political movement initiated by Mao Ze-
dong in China from 1966 to 1976, resulted in a “severe setback 
of China culture and social development”1.  Both camps in the 
current Hong Kong society employ terms specifically tied to 
the Cultural Revolution to draw direct analogies to the on-go-
ing situation, the general social ambiance, as well as particular 
actions of individuals and parties. This shared application of 
vocabulary not only poses a peculiar case due to the polariza-
tion of the language in the current protests, but also due to the 
sensitive nature of the Cultural Revolution, which has been a 
taboo for the Communist Party of China (CPC).
Comparisons between the pro-democracy protests or 
the pro-government counter-protests, with the Cultural Revo-
lution, made by Hong Kong writers who position differently in 
the political spectrum, thus worth our investigation. This essay 
aims to analyze the use of the Cultural Revolution as a rhetor-
ical device by Hong Kong people in online media platforms to 
draw insights on locals’ perception of the Cultural Revolution. 
This essay suggests that the use of the Cultural Revolution as 
an idiomatic weapon to attack the opposing camp reveals Hong 
Kong people’s multilayer conceptions of the Cultural Revolu-
tion, which continues to play a role in the current society. 
II.
During the Cultural Revolution, Mao mobilized the 
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mass to consolidate his leadership in the party and revive 
the revolutionary spirit by struggling against party enemies, 
overthrowing local authorities, and destroying traditional rel-
ics. Factory productions halted and schools were closed amid 
a stateless and lawless society. Student organizations known 
as the Red Guards were mobilized by Mao to catalyze terror 
by going on a rampage, destroying state property and beating 
up people. Local fractions divided by political differences and 
personal vendetta had large-scale militant clashes. It resulted in 
millions of death, socio-political chaos, and permanent loss of 
historical artifacts2.  
The Cultural Revolution spilled over the Shenzhen 
border to Hong Kong, which had been under British colonial 
rule since 1841. While many Mainlanders escaped to Hong 
Kong from the chaos and gained residency from the loose im-
migration policy, communists and their supporters in the crown 
colony rallied and put up “big-character posters” to stand in 
solidarity with their Mainland counterparts. In May 1967, riots 
broke out as a result of the heightened political climate and so-
cial tension, and was put down by the royal police force. Most 
pro-Communists organizations were outlawed by the govern-
ment and marginalized by the public3. 
The 1967 Riot has been well-studied, but scholars’ 
analysis of the ramifications of the Cultural Revolution to the 
city usually ends here. However, the ripples of the Revolution 
can still felt as strong evidence of the failure and brutality of 
the CPC leadership. Locals weaponize the incident by mak-
ing analogies between a certain aspect of the Culture Revolu-
tion and that of their opponents, so as to highlight and attack 
each other’s wrongdoings. This process of weaponization, in 
which an idea, concept, or object is translated into an effective 
propaganda message and used as a rhetorical assault, operates 
on several levels politically, socially and culturally4. Weapon-
ization can be used to legitimize one’s cause and attack the 
enemies, empowered by the virality of verbal and visual com-
munication. It creates a battlefield where enemies competed 
for justification, favors, and influence5. In this case, most Hong 
Kong people have believed that Mainlanders in the Cultural 
Revolution were uncivilized and irrational, in comparison to 
the self-perceived image of Hong Kongers that has been edu-
cated and sensible, which has been consolidated by the unpop-
ularity of the 1967 riot. There have been copious attempts to 
draw similarities between the Cultural Revolution and political 
movement in Hong Kong in this decade, like the 2014 Um-
brella Movement and the 2016 Mongkok Riot. This essay thus 
extends the academic conversation on the longlasting effect of 
the Cultural Revolution as a serious part of the local anti-Bei-
jing and anti-China sentiments in nowadays.
III.
The term “Cultural Revolution” appearing in articles 
about the recent protests of both pro-democracy and pro-gov-
ernment camps. The term is unanimously perceived negatively, 
which is peculiar itself given the “multiplicity of standpoints 
on historical events.”  While it may be understandable for the 
anti-Beijing camp to use the radical Revolution to embarrass 
the authority, the same action is surprising for the pro-gov-
ernment camp. The CPC has adopted a policy of evasion and 
treated it as a sensitive issue. The Hong Kong pro-government 
camp’s, as well as the pro-democracy camp’s, high-profile de-
nunciation of the Revolution, may be explained by their effort 
in weaponizing the Cultural Revolution as a silver bullet. 
The weaponization works on the foundation that most 
of the Hong Kong people know about the Cultural Revolution 
and have an aligned negative view on it. Articles of both camps 
refer to the situation roiled by the protests now in Hong Kong 
as “Hong-Kong style Cultural Revolution,” or “Cultural Rev-
olution 2.0.”6 Titles that asserts the Cultural Revolution with 
“gory,” “wail” and “losing people’s heart” display explicit 
negative connotation7. This negativity is well developed in the 
articles when writers parallel it with the damaging phenomena 
of the current protests. 
The term “Cultural Revolution” is used more than as a 
buzzword in the titles but is employed to describe the destruc-
tion and violence occurred in the current movement by writers 
of both sides. The anti-protesters camp stresses the physical 
assaults made by young students during the strikes. For exam-
ple, in his opinion piece that advocates the need to terminate 
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the youngsters’ violence, Yu Pinghai condemns the university 
students, just like the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution, 
in destroying stores, beating up opponents, and throwing pet-
rol bombs and claims such actions recreated the lawlessness 
society in the Cultural Revolution8. On the other side of the 
coin, Luo Xiaoran denounces police sieges in universities ssnd 
condemns the destruction of the grave of Principal Cai Yuan-
pei in Hong Kong9. He labels the renowned Chinese educa-
tor-politician Cai as the leading figure in pursuing academic 
freedom in China, thus labels the destruction of the grave as an 
act of demolishing freedom. Luo compares this act to “ destroy 
the Four Olds” during the Cultural Revolution in which his-
torical monuments were eradicated. The Cultural Revolution 
becomes a symbol of political violence and the writer’s  weap-
on depends on their denunciation of the Cultural Revolution 
—  the more violent they can make the Cultural Revolution 
appear, the more uncivilized their current opponents are.
Aside from smashing properties, writers also ap-
ply the historical metaphor to the struggling campaigns now. 
“Struggling session” was a public collective plot in the Mao-
ist era to attack the Party’s enemies with verbal humiliations 
and physical assaults10. It created unbearable harm to the body 
and mentality of victims, who ranged from top party leaders to 
local landowners and teachers. In the current discourse, for in-
stance, Fang in his article highlights the “wind of struggling.”11 
He denounces radical protesters who struggled against every-
one who had different political opinions with them, even when 
they were their closest teachers, colleagues, and parents. The 
struggles against the university principal and staff, as well as 
government officials, which include spreading hate speech and 
online vigilantism, also are the targets of Fang’s condemna-
tion. “Struggle,” (批鬥 pidou) a term Fang uses repeatedly, is a 
specific vocabulary that is contextualized with socio-political 
movements in the early PRC era and popularized in the Cul-
tural Revolution. 
Meanwhile, the pro-democracy camp also alleges 
their opposing camp of performing “struggling.” Qu Weilin’s 
article, which brings the severity of the current government op-
pression of citizens to light, asserts Beijing’s “struggles against 
the rich people and property owners in Hong Kong.”12 She is 
mainly referring to the government and its official media’s ac-
cusation against the wealthiest merchant in Hong Kong, Lee 
Kashing. Her sentence ends with a prophecy of a soon occur-
rence of a  “Cultural Revolution 2.0” in Hong Kong. Siding 
with Qu and the protests, Guan Jianwen scorns at Fang’s label 
of the Cultural Revolution on the protesters when he literally 
highlights in his blog post the mob attack in Yuen Long on 21 
July against the supporters of the protests13. Like many critics 
of the police force and the government, he identifies the mob 
as criminal gangs. He implies that the anti-protester crimes 
group’s struggle against ordinary citizens is the prelude to soon 
reappearance in Hong Kong of bloody struggle sessions in the 
Cultural Revolution. 
The struggling campaigns mentioned by the writers 
shed light on their denunciation on extreme identity politics. 
In the Cultural Revolution, the PRC government used “label-
ing” to create two camps – the “Reds” and the “Blacks.” The 
“Blacks” were portrayed as villains from rich families who con-
stantly plan to revolt against the regime14. Similarly, “political 
labeling” was used in the police force in Hong Kong and polit-
ical hatred was fostered against the “new black five categories” 
– students, layers, journalists, medical personnel and social 
workers. In the same vein, protestors point their swords to ev-
ery policeman and pro-government citizens regardless of their 
actual behavior and speech. In these articles, the rhetoric of em-
ploying the term “struggle” to substitute every personal assault 
made by the opposing camp was not only to raise the level of 
harm created but accuse the opposing camp in their political im-
morality and incorrectness. The struggling campaigns not only 
polarize society, but also questioned the morals like respecting 
elders since many victims of the “struggling campaigns” in both 
eras have been close family members and teachers.
IV.
The weaponization of the Cultural Revolution is based 
on a consensus that the majority of Hong Kong people have 
similar knowledge of the Cultural Revolution. The quotation 
of slogans and borrowing of vocabulary in the Cultural Revo-
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lution shows a higher level of learning of the revolution. This 
historical knowledge, and the unanimous negative resonance 
based on history, should not be taken for granted when the ed-
ucation of the sensitive political events in China, and allegedly 
starting in Hong Kong, had been tightly controlled, and they 
were not taught or euphuistically spoken of in the education of 
Chinese history. 
On top of the education of the event, Hong Kong peo-
ple’s perception of the Cultural Revolution is also based on 
personal or collective memory and ties. As Brickers and Yip 
acknowledge in the testimonies of the witnesses of the 1967 
Riots in Hong Kong, first-person accounts “reminds us an im-
portant dimension of history: an awareness of the past that is 
personally felt.”15 Most of the refugees who escaped to Hong 
Kong, as victims of the Revolution, resented the Cultural Rev-
olution. The sentiment was shared by most Hong Kong locals 
who were horrified to see dead bodies floating on the harbors 
from the Shenzhen River16.  
The Cultural Revolution leaves enduring legacy in 
Hong Kong based on collective knowledge and memory. It 
continues to polarize society by strengthening the arguments 
between pro-Communist camp and their opponents. Mean-
while, it also acts as a tool of “othering” between locals and 
Mainlanders. This process of othering, as proposed Elaine 
Chan, is no longer initiated by the government as she suggest-
ed, but became a botton-up movement17. The characteristics 
of Hong Kong mentioned in the articles, including the rule of 
law, the democratic system, and freedom of speech, which both 
camps accused the other of destroying, are indicators that Hong 
Kong is different from China and constitute the pride in Hong 
Kong identity. The collective memory of the Cultural Revolu-
tion has provided Hong Kong people a group identity through 
the construction of narrative, which was built on victimization. 
The Red Guards and generally Mainlanders in that era were 
portrayed as aggressors and killers. Hong Kong media still 
employs this generalization to distinguish the locals and their 
mainland counterparts. The weaponization of the Cultural Rev-
olution thus displays long-lasting impact of this incident. 
VI.
The current protests in Hong Kong constitute a defin-
ing moment in the city’s history. While Hong Kong’s future 
is unclear to us, the weaponization of the Cultural Revolution 
is the discourse surrounding the protests offered us some in-
sights. The vocabulary of the Cultural Revolution is the media 
to channel denunciation, if not hatred, in multidimensions to-
wards their opponents. Their opponents’ notorious behavior is 
advertised through the terms in the Cultural Revolution, thus 
making those acts even more sinister. This reveals that the ulti-
mate goals of the effective weaponization are not only to attack 
the opposing camp, but also to mobilize or demobilize their 
readers. This is both the cause and the result of the polarization 
of Hong Kong society, which will possibly extend beyond pro-
tests. More than 40 years after the Revolution ended, it is still 
shaping the relations between the supporters and opponents of 
Beijing. Scholars should view the Cultural Revolution as still 
having an ongoing impact, while the Hong Kong locals should 
prevent the Cultural Revolution from truly reappearing. 
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